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Random Ramblings
from page 53
last year at this time.” Even if access has
increased since last year and even if students
are more likely to have access than non-students, these figures suggest that a significant
number of college students can’t use their
online library resources from home. Since the
conference, I’ve been asking librarian guest
speakers in my academic libraries course
about students without home computers.
Their response has been unanimous: they
encounter many students for whom campus
access is the only alternative.
Beyond the campus, the public library
used to be the great equalizer. A poor kid
whose parents couldn’t afford to buy books
could check them out from the local library,
take them home, read them, and then go back
for more. A voracious reader could at least
partially overcome the disadvantage of less
than adequate schools and gain the knowledge
and skills needed to get into a good college or
land a good job. Large public libraries might
even provide more convenient resources for
college students, at least for undergraduates.
While books remain for reading in the public
library, access to scholarly online resources
beyond those suitable for high school is less
likely. Furthermore, some public libraries
allow access only to information resources
and don’t make available the software such as
word processing and spreadsheets needed to

complete assignments. Finally, according to
Public Libraries and the Internet 2009: Study
Results and Findings, around 18% don’t allow
users to connect flash drives to public library
computers, so the students can’t store their
work or information findings for later use.
A digital divide that hinders getting
educated is especially troublesome in these
difficult economic times when employers require more skills and higher degrees. Detroit,
where I live, used to be a place where a high
school graduate could get a job that supported
a middle class lifestyle. Manufacturing jobs
moved abroad, and the remaining ones pay
much less than they used to. My university’s
enrollment is reasonably steady even in these
tough times because area residents are getting
more education in hopes of bettering their
lives. While upward mobility in America
has often been more of a myth than a reality,
America nonetheless needs a better educated
work force to complete in the global economy.
Hindering intelligent, talented students whose
only fault is being poor from accessing library
resources to complete the assignments that
will lead to academic success, needed skills,
and required degrees seems to me a violation
of the American social contract, if not an
outright denial of the American dream.
This article has come a long way from the
optimistic view of the digital future painted
by Michael Stephens to a gloomy prediction
of a permanent underclass from the lack of
computer access and skills. Michael and I
didn’t come up with an answer in Charleston.

I still don’t have one now. I would suggest
that all libraries, but especially academic
libraries, think about those students without
computers and perhaps more importantly
without broadband Internet access as they
implement new services that move away from
print to digital. I do have a few suggestions.
Buy the extra copy of an important book in
print even if the library already has a digital
copy. Make sure that students can download
to their flash drives even if doing so increases
security risks. Have enough fast computers
somewhere on campus for all who need to
use them. Maximize the library Website for
speedy loading and subscribe to electronic
resources that do the same in the hopes that
some students might get by with a dial-up
connection. I’m sure that others could come
up with additional suggestions. I agree that
digital is the future of academic libraries,
but libraries could at least recognize that the
change has a downside for some users.
I’ll close by confessing why this issue is so
important to me. I grew up in a lower middle
class family where money was tight. Through
hard work, scholarships, and the help of public
and academic libraries, I received a doctorate
from Yale University and a masters in library
science from Columbia University. I’d like
hard working, intelligent students who are
unlucky enough to be poor to have the same
opportunities. To do so, they need to find a
way to cross the digital divide. We should
take it upon ourselves as individuals and as a
profession to help them make it.
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T

he suit brought on April 15, 2008, by
three academic publishers — the presses
of Cambridge and Oxford universities
and the commercial house Sage — against
Georgia State University is wending its way
through the legal process of the federal court
of the Northern District of Georgia, and it
may be several months yet before any judicial
opinion is forthcoming. But the case has
already included an interesting intervention
by Columbia professor Kenneth D.
Crews, well-known to many as a
frequent lecturer and writer
on copyright issues and
the long-time head of
Indiana University’s
Copyright Management Center in Indianapolis, which produced
a great deal of very useful
educational material aimed
at helping graduate students
and faculty understand their
rights and responsibilities under
copyright law.
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The law firm of King & Spalding representing the defendants in the case commissioned Crews to prepare an “expert report”
on copyright law and fair use as it pertains to
the policies and practices carried on at Georgia State, and initially a 72-page document
was submitted to the court on June 1, 2009.
After responses were provided by the plaintiffs and their attorneys, Crews completed a
rebuttal, filed on November 2. These are the
two documents that will
be the main focus of
this article. They are
accessible at Peter
Hirtle’s LibraryLaw
blog here: http://blog.
librarylaw.com/librarylaw/2009/11/crews-important-studies-on-ereserves.html.
First it may be
helpful to lay out the
background to this suit,
briefly. Concern among
publishers about the way

that e-reserve systems were developing in
libraries, threatening to take the place of
print coursepacks, began to grow in the early
1990s. The first formal effort to reach some
consensus about how e-reserve systems should
function took place within the context of the
Conference on Fair Use (CONFU), convened
in September 1994 as part of the Clinton
Administration’s National Information
Infrastructure Initiative. (A useful summary
of CONFU is available here: http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/confu2.htm.)
E-reserves was one of five topics the CONFU
participants discussed, but perhaps the most
contentious, so much so that no recommendation about it was included in the final report of
November 1998.
While Crews acknowledges his role in
the CONFU process as someone who “participated in that subgroup” that developed the
Fair Use Guidelines for Electronic Reserve
Systems (Expert Report, p. 25), he is being
far too modest. In fact, Crews was recruited
to be the principal drafter of those guidelines.
continued on page 55
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I know because I was the lead negotiator for
the AAUP in working with Crews to incorporate language that would allow the AAUP
to endorse the guidelines. (Lolly Gasaway
was another member of the drafting committee.) Foremost among my objectives was
to have the guidelines recognize explicitly
that e-reserves were to function in the same
fashion as traditional print reserve systems, in
providing supplemental materials for a course
and not constituting an entire coursepack. The
key sentence in this regard is the following:
“When materials are included as a matter of
fair use, electronic reserve systems should
constitute an ad hoc or supplemental source of
information for students, beyond a textbook or
other materials.” (The full text of the Guidelines is available here: http://www.utsystem.
edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/rsrvguid.htm.)
This qualification is what allowed the AAUP
to add its name to the list of groups endorsing
the Guidelines (which also included the ACLS
plus a number of smaller library associations,
but not the ALA, ARL, or AAP, whose political positions at the time all were based on
hopes of winning the battle subsequently in
Congress). The judge in the GSU case is probably not aware of Crews’ real role in CONFU
and his acceptance of this principle as a reasonable interpretation of fair use in application
to e-reserves. The e-reserve policy as stated
now at the University System of Georgia’s
Website (http://www.usg.edu/copyright/additional_guidelines_for_electronic_reserves)
conspicuously omits this consideration of
e-reserves not substituting for coursepacks,
although Crews’ own survey of policies in his
Expert Report reveals this to be included in the
policies at many other universities, which he
admits adopted much of the approach taken in
the CONFU Guidelines.
With the failure of CONFU to produce any
consensus about e-reserves, publishers continued to worry and began to monitor practices
as best they could be determined from Internet
searches. I was a member of the Copyright
Education Committee of the AAP during this
period, and this group was asked by the AAP
Copyright Committee to undertake a survey
of e-reserve policies. Our research produced
a report in February 2003 covering 103 institutions of higher education in 23 states, from
community colleges through the largest public
and private universities, and revealed that, despite the refusal of CONFU to adopt them, the
Guidelines that Crews had drafted had de facto
become the operating principles for many of
these institutions, wherever they went beyond
just a bald restatement of the law’s Section 107
itself. It appears that the sentiment expressed in
the University of Texas System’s summary of
CONFU was widespread: “the work performed
by this group presents a valuable starting point
for institutions wishing to develop their own
electronic reserve guidelines.” In his Expert
Report, Crews summarizes a similar survey
he undertook, covering 37 institutions in 23
states. Although the two surveys only overlap
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to some degree, it was interesting to see that,
when percentages were provided for amounts
of material copied, the figure from our 2003
report was most often in the range of 10% to
15%, occasionally 20%, but never as much as
the 25% that appears for a number of institutions in Crews’ survey — which suggests
that over the past half-dozen years libraries
have gotten bolder in their assertion of fair
use with respect to e-reserve practices. This
is not to suggest that even the lower figure
can be taken as a reliable rule of thumb: as
Crews himself emphasizes, no one factor is
determinative in any fair-use analysis, and all
four factors as well as other considerations that
are relevant in any given case come into play in
the assessment of what is fair in the particular
circumstances.
Following upon this survey by the Copyright Education Committee, the AAP Copyright Committee set up an E-Reserves Task
Force to which I was appointed. It began its
work by reviewing the CONFU Guidelines
but agreed after lengthy discussions over many
months to settle for an FAQ rather than another
set of guidelines. These have been posted
since the summer of 2004 here: http://www.
publishers.org/main/Copyright/CopyKey/copyKey_01_02.htm. The preparation of this
FAQ was spurred in part by investigations of
practices at some campuses of the University of California where evidence had been
uncovered of massive amounts of e-reserve
copying that the AAP and AAUP considered
to be well beyond what fair use permitted.
Subsequent efforts to resolve these problems
with the counsel’s office for the California
system proved fruitless. Greater cooperation
came later from a number of other universities
that were approached in 2007 by the AAP,
including Cornell, Hofstra, Marquette, and
Syracuse. Georgia State was among the
universities the AAP tried to engage in these
discussions, but it rebuffed every attempt. The
suit was brought as a last resort.
It is very important for everyone to understand why Georgia State proved to be so
intransigent. The official copyright policy
of the Regents of the University System of
Georgia had been based on an idiosyncratic
theory promulgated by a prominent copyright
expert based at the University of Georgia Law
School named L. Ray Patterson. This theory
is explicated in, among other places, the book
he co-authored with Stanley W. Lindberg
titled The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’
Rights published by the University of Georgia
Press in 1991. The theory allows for a distinction between “use of the work” and “use of the
copyright.” Use of the work, Patterson argues,
is a right of “personal use” that copyright law
must recognize as inherent in the Constitutional
mandate for copyright to promote learning:
“the personal-use principle prohibits copyright
from being used to inhibit a user’s efforts to
learn” (p. 70). Use of the copyright, which is
the proper subject of fair use, pertains to the
use by a competitor in another publication.
Since no “publication” is involved in the use
of a work included in a coursepack or posted
on an e-reserve system, according to this theory
there can be no infringement, no matter how

much material is duplicated. It doesn’t matter to
Patterson that this “may well enable individuals [or, presumably, their proxies in on-campus
copy centers or libraries also] to make copies
of copyrighted works instead of purchasing
them” (p. 157).
Interestingly, the first draft of this book was
presented in the guise of a “neutral” guide to
fair use for faculty. I was a pre-publication
reviewer of this book for the University of
Georgia Press and, along with the other reviewer, vociferously protested to the Press that
it was anything but and, if published, should
be honestly presented as the argumentative
treatise it really was. Even though the Press
followed this advice, the authors nevertheless
succeeded in their goal of having the Georgia
System adopt this theory as its official policy.
I cite as an authority here Crews himself (who
was, ironically, the first recipient of the L. Ray
Patterson Award from the ALA in 2005). In
Copyright, Fair Use, and the Challenge for
Universities (Chicago, 1993), Crews observes
that while he was completing the survey of
university copyright policies for this book, “the
legal counsel for the University of Georgia
replied that the university had no such policy
and that copyright issues simply were not a
priority concern for the institution. After the
closure of surveys…the university issued the
most extraordinary, the most original, and the
most ‘lenient’ of all university policy statements.” He goes on to say:
A committee of faculty, administrators,
librarians, and legal counsel issued a
162-page “handbook” and a sixteenpage set of “guidelines” that survey the
purpose and history of copyright, that
outline the structure of the law, and that
detail the law’s application to numerous
specific situations. Two members of
the committee were professors L. Ray
Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg,
whose 1991 book tests the limits of user
privileges under copyright and proffers
an expansive argument. The Georgia
policy is expressly based on their book.
In accordance with the legal arguments
of Patterson and Lindberg, the Georgia
policy identifies generous opportunities
of “personal use” and fair use….
The Georgia document is the most ambitious statement from any university on
copyright’s underlying purposes and
on the law’s implications for specific
circumstances. The policy also tests
the limits of copyright interpretation….
Professor Patterson is not known
for conforming to the latest judicial
opinions when he can argue that those
opinions misinterpret the law and
ignore its historical and constitutional
foundation.
Few institutions share the boldness
of the University of Georgia. The
university should be commended for
avoiding form policy statements and for
identifying the broadest scope of user
rights. The Georgia policy is worthy of
close study by any university establishing its own standards, but no university
continued on page 56
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should adopt those standards without
a careful assessment of their full substantive implications and the possible
consequences — both the beneficial
and the troublesome consequences — of
testing the law’s limits so extensively.”
(pp. 117-118)
It should be perfectly clear from Crews’
own description that the Georgia System’s
policy was way out at one extreme, being
the most “lenient” of all university policies
he surveyed for his book. In fact, it was so
extreme that when the Georgia state attorney’s
office became involved in the case after the suit
was brought, it was determined that the policy
would be indefensible in court, and subsequently the old policy itself was abandoned and
a new one adopted in its place. Patterson may
not have cared much about “the latest judicial
opinions,” but the state attorney could hardly
afford to ignore them in defending its client!
Probably few people not involved closely
in this case are aware that the policy now
being defended by Georgia is not the same
as the policy in effect when the suit was first
brought. And it is this new policy, not the old
one about which Crews had expressed such
doubts himself, that is the subject of Crews’
own two reports to the court.
The playing field thus has shifted during
the course of this case in very significant
ways. Because the plaintiffs were not seeking
damages for past infringements but only an
injunction against future illegal copying, the
defendants’ lawyers cleverly sought to avoid
any responsibility for previous practices and
at the same time preempt arguments about the
likelihood of future infringement by changing
the rules of the game with the adoption of a
whole new policy and justificatory framework.
Past actions were moot, they told the court,
and the University should be judged only according to its promised new behavior. What
is still very much at issue, however, is whether
in spite of the new policy the practices have
actually changed much, if at all. Crews notes
at one point that “since the adoption of the new
policy, the library has reviewed and rejected
at least one request to copy a large portion
of a book” (Expert Report, p. 55). Considering the massive amounts of copying that had
been going on under the old policy, this “one
request” hardly seems like much progress. Old
habits die hard.
With this review of past developments
concerning e-reserves as background, it is
now time to take a closer look at Crews’ two
reports. The first, called the Expert Report, has
as its main aim an assessment of the new University System of Georgia policy adopted only
after the publishers’ suit was brought. This
report summarizes the growth and evolution of
e-reserve systems since the early 1990s; traces
how copyright law, especially fair use, has been
applied by courts over the past couple of decades; analyzes the limitations of three model
policies developed for reserve readings (the
Classroom Guidelines, which were included in
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the legislative history accompanying the 1976
Copyright Act, the 1982 ALA Model Policy,
which was adopted by that library association
in response to the alleged overly restrictive
nature of the Guidelines, and the CONFU
Guidelines of 1996); surveys e-reserve policies in place at 23 colleges and universities;
discusses common elements of an e-reserve
policy; and finally evaluates the new policy in
light of the foregoing review. Not surprisingly,
Crews concludes that this policy “is consistent
with the copyright law of the United States, and
when followed by instructors, librarians, and
others at the university, the policy will provide
an effective means for promoting compliance
with the law at the university” (p. 69). He
further notes that “the policy is consistent with,
and similar to, many policies that have been in
place at colleges and universities throughout
the country” (p. 70).
One reason for this similarity is that the
Georgia System adopted as part of the new policy the fair-use checklist that Crews himself had
pioneered at Indiana University in 1997 (as he
acknowledges on p. 58) and then instituted at
Columbia University when he went there in
2007 to become director of its Copyright Advisory Office. Crews could hardly fault Georgia
for practicing what he himself had preached,
but this certainly makes Georgia’s hiring him
as an expert a very incestuous relationship.
It also helps explain why Crews’ evaluation
of the checklist is very biased and hardly
“objective.” While emphasizing elsewhere
in his Expert Report the situational nature of
fair-use analysis and the need to be flexible in
applying it, Crews glosses over what is the
major defect of the checklist as it is applied at
Georgia, viz., its highly mechanical deployment. The instructions on the checklist itself,
which faculty are urged to fill out and keep as
a permanent record to show their “good faith”
(for the purpose of taking advantage of section
504(c)(2)’s limitations on liability), begin thus:
“Where the factors favoring fair use outnumber
those against it, reliance on fair use is justified.
Where fewer than half the factors favor fair
use, instructors should seek permission from
the rights holder. Where the factors are evenly
split, instructors should consider the total facts
weighing in favor of fair use as opposed to the
total facts weighing against fair use in deciding
whether fair use is justified.” This additive
method is contrary to the spirit of fair use, and
Crews should have condemned it. He knows
better. This passage from an article by Robert
Kasunic in the Columbia Journal of Law & the
Arts captures that spirit well:
Only by accepting the value of all of
the factors will the promise of the multifaceted approach espoused by Judge
Leval (and Justice Souter in Campbell)
become a reality. No factor is superior,
nor is any interrelationship of the factors
dominant. All of the factors are perspectives of the whole picture, and the
whole picture can only be understood
by mining all of the information that is
available from the unique perspective
of each factor. The factors are guides
to intensive fact gathering. None of the
factors weigh in favor or against fair use.

Rather, their cumulative information
provides the basis for the analysis as a
whole. The fair use analysis is not a tally
sheet, but an examination of the interrelationships of the facts and the factors,
while keeping in mind the primary purpose of copyright. (pp. 115-116)
The full article is available here: http://
www.kasunic.com/Articles/CJLA%20Kasun
ic%20Final%202008.pdf. It was favorably
cited by Kevin L. Smith on his blog at Duke’s
library: http://library.duke.edu/blogs/scholcomm/2009/08/13/choosing-between-reformand-revolution. Presumably, Smith would
agree with this characterization of fair-use
analysis, and I think Crews, if pressed, would
agree as well. The Georgia checklist does
not conform to this way of understanding fair
use, and Crews should have criticized it in
this regard.
In his Expert Report, Crews makes much of
the “one time use is fair use” doctrine, claiming
that it has operated to raise costs for universities
because they have not exercised their fair-use
rights for subsequent uses. But there is another
way of looking at this doctrine. Crews wants
to argue that there are many good reasons to
consider subsequent uses fair as well as the
initial uses, and he blames the widespread
adoption of this rule on the concept of “spontaneity” that was incorporated into the Classroom
Guidelines in 1976 and later accepted by the
ALA Model Policy, too. But one could equally
argue now that, with the ability to secure many
permissions now almost instantaneously, this
rule has outlived its original justification. The
origin of this doctrine as a university policy can
be traced to the University of Texas System’s
copyright guidelines developed by Georgia
Harper, which greatly influenced the way
policies at other universities were written.
Harper had herself challenged the Classroom
Guidelines’ interpretation of “spontaneous” as
far too restrictive when applied to higher education, where it could often take weeks or even
many months to secure permissions. Hence,
she argued, first-time use should be fair use
given the difficulty of obtaining permissions
quickly, but then permission for use in subsequent semesters should be obtained because
there would indeed be enough time to get the
licenses needed. But with the development by
the CCC of virtually instant permissioning processes, this rationale no longer obtains. Hence
the real question to raise is not, as Crews would
have it, whether subsequent uses should be allowed under fair use also, but rather whether
even that first-time use should be permitted as
fair use. Georgia Harper has made this case
herself in an article titled “Digital Distribution
of Educational Materials” in which this revealing footnote appears:
1
The recent introduction by CCC of
its Blackboard tool allowing educators to obtain and pay for permission
“instantly” has theoretically eliminated
the logical justification underlying the
Classroom Guidelines’ “spontaneity”
requirement and underlying the claim
for “first time fair use,” which was based
on an historically significant time delay
continued on page 57
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in getting permission (weeks, if not
months). Before the introduction of the
instant permissions tool in Blackboard,
one would evaluate whether a use were
fair (for example, whether it was the first
time the professor used these materials
for this class) before seeking permission
from CCC. Now, however, with its
rationale gone, first time fair use may be
insupportable. It seems to make more
sense to check CCC first and only if permission is not available there, consider
whether the use might be fair before
undertaking the still time-consuming
and potentially unfruitful search for the
copyright owner.
In explaining how copyright law has
evolved, in Part V of the Expert Report, Crews
unleashes the same seductive argument that
Jonathan Band deployed in his white paper
on educational use for the ARL, claiming
that e-reserve and coursepack use could be
seen as “transformative.” Hence, on p. 19,
Crews says:
In some respects, the use of the materials
may be transformative. For example,
an article in a scholarly journal was
originally written and published for
purposes of advancing scholarship. If
the article is about medicine, the purpose
is for advancing medical treatment and
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improving health conditions. If that
same article is part of the assigned reading in a course, its use is transformed
into a teaching tool. The article may
be assigned for purposes of advancing
medicine, but it might also be assigned
as an example of research methods or
even to study trends in research funding
or scholarly publishing. In an electronic
environment, the instructor may add
questions and references for further
study, and students may add commentary and observations. In the hands of
the teacher and student, the article takes
on a new purpose.
Without repeating all the arguments I made
in response to Band’s white paper (in “What
Is Educational Fair Use?” Against the Grain,
v.20#2, April 2008), let me admit that there
may be a point on the spectrum where “transformative” begins to make sense, as it would
if a teacher really integrated all the readings
into some kind of running commentary surrounding them (and maybe this is why the
Kinko’s judge did not rule out anthologizing
altogether as beyond the reach of fair use, as
Crews notes elsewhere in a different context).
But, typically, the readings are just assigned via
a syllabus, which hardly offers enough by way
of “transformation” to qualify as fair use. It is
also disingenuous to argue that scholarly work
is produced just for the “purpose” of advancing scholarship, and that teaching is a different
“purpose” altogether for use of scholarly work.
That distinction flies in the face of all that uni-

versities talk about in promoting the integration
of teaching and research, and it certainly does
not correspond with the actual activities of
academic publishers in making scholarly books
available in paperback precisely for use in the
classroom. There is a real direct impact on the
market here that Crews glosses over by claiming that “noncommercial” uses are likely not to
have much impact on “commercial” markets.
He forgets that 90% of what we university
presses publish have no other market than the
academy! Crews’ attempt to argue for flexibility about determining what amount to copy,
following on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Campbell, depends on the notion of using
whatever amount is “necessary” to serve the
purpose at hand — which is an open invitation
to instructors to use whatever amount they want
since they can always justify it in reference to
the “educational purpose” they have for any
given assignment. We would here quickly get
onto a slippery slope, and what judge is going
to substitute his or her own understanding of
“educational purpose” for the instructor’s?
(It may be worth noting here, though, that
applying the lessons of Campbell herself in a
1979 case involving a musical comedy called
“Scarlett Fever” whose creators claimed it to be
fair use as a parody of Gone with the Wind, the
judge presiding in the GSU case found it not
to contain enough elements to make it overall
transformative as a work of parody, ruled it to
have used much more than was necessary for
that purpose, and — using a functional test
continued on page 58
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developed by David Nimmer to determine
what is a purpose different from the original
purpose — held it to be harmful to the market
for the original.) At any rate, Crews here goes
beyond what the Georgia System itself claims:
the e-reserve policy at the Georgia Website now
does not currently make this argument about
“transformative use.”
The Rebuttal Expert Report (hereinafter
called just the Rebuttal Report) has a more limited aim than the initial report. It addresses just
two questions: 1) is licensing of copyrighted
works a substitute for the implementation of
a fair-use standard and policy? 2) does the
exercise of fair use pose risks to the survival
of scholarly publishing? Crews answers both
questions in the negative.
On the first point Crews argues strenuously
against viewing licensing as an effective solution to the problems faced by faculty and accords it, at best, a partial role in supplementing
what fair-use analysis should instead provide.
Rather than try rebutting his arguments myself,
I defer to Georgia Harper, who took up this
question in her Connectea blog in July 2007
where she responded to James Boyle’s essay
“The Inefficiencies of Freedom” criticizing the
then new CCC blanket license:
I’ve read many works by Boyle and
always find his analysis to be thoughtful
and thought-provoking…. As a result, I
was stunned to see that he impliedly labeled as irresponsible large universities
like mine that might consider including
among the many sources we use to
provide legal access to educational materials CCC’s new academic license….
Somehow this license will
sweep away all of fair use,
as though one couldn’t
thoughtfully conclude that
paying for permission was
in many cases the right thing
to do because a good part of
what we do is not fair use.
He easily equated fair use
for creative uses (parody,
criticism, commentary) with
fair use for the massive duplication of works created,
in many cases, just for our
higher education market….
As much as we may dislike the fact that
the market for permissions and licensed
works has been held numerous times to
negatively affect the exercise of fair use,
that is how the cases involving systematic
duplication and distribution have gone.
Further, I don’t believe our not making a
profit on these copies will completely flip
the results of those types of cases.
…. Boyle is singling out, as incompatible with fair use, this particular way
of paying for uses we make of others’
works. He’s afraid that if your university just writes a check to CCC for, let’s
say, $100,000, so that all the works that
are covered by the license (the “reper-
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toire”) can be used in the typical ways
we use such works in connection with
classroom assignments without having
to report how many copies were made
of which particular works (that is, efficiently), it becomes easy to ignore the
question of whether a particular use is
a fair use. Who cares whether it’s fair
use or not? And Boyle’s concern is that
if we don’t care about fair use here, fair
use will disappear altogether.
Sounds logical, except that fair use is not
a monolithic all or nothing proposition.
The fair use test comes out differently
depending on the facts about each use.
His argument is not that different from
saying that if we don’t rely on fair use
to copy an entire book, we’ll lose the
right to quote a single line from a book.
Those two things are qualitatively, not
just quantitatively, different. Creative
uses and duplicative, iterative, plain
old copying and distributing uses are
very different and the courts have consistently recognized that.
…. These cases [involving Grateful
Dead posters and Perfect 10’s images]
say to me that creative uses have a strong
claim to fair use; even duplicative uses
without a market for permission have a
strong claim to fair use.
But duplicative uses where there is a
functional, efficient market for permission are not enjoying the same strong
claim in the courts. I don’t think the
courts are going to begin any time soon
to paint with the broad strokes that Boyle
fears. I too believe that we have to draw
a line in the sand about fair use.
…. I just don’t agree with Boyle about
which side of the line our
systematic, massive copying
and distribution of classroom
materials falls on. In theory,
maybe some time in the past,
it all, or some large part of it,
fell within fair use. But with
today’s markets for licensing
and permission, and courts
that are all over that concept
when it comes to this kind of
use, I have come to believe
that that time has passed.
There are cases where I still
feel we reasonably rely on
fair use for classroom materials, but they
are a small percentage of all our uses.
Clearly, Crews agrees more with Boyle
than with Harper. But as Harper points out,
Boyle doesn’t have the responsibility she does
to advise the university about what risks to
take. One might say the same about Crews,
in reference to Georgia, if not Columbia
University where, presumably, he does have
the same kind of responsibility that Harper
did. I wonder if Columbia has refused a CCC
license on his advice?
In his cost/benefit analysis Crews simply
ignores entirely the great savings that come
from a blanket license like CCC’s, which allows for storage of digital files for reuse from

semester to semester whereas, under Georgia’s
policy and almost every other one he cites, the
files must be destroyed at the end of each term
and reconstituted again for use in subsequent
semesters. Crews also vastly overstates the
cost and difficulty of centralizing copyright
clearance services on campus and taking that
burden off of faculty, who have neither the
time nor inclination to devote to learning the
intricacies of copyright law (as we publishers
have discovered when we observe that academic authors seldom even bother to read the
contracts they sign for books and articles we
publish for them, let alone educate themselves
about copyright). I can cite the success that
Penn State has had with just such a centralized service for coursepack copying, which
operates to insulate faculty from liability also,
as the University guarantees to protect faculty
from infringement suits only when they use
this service and do not go off campus to get
copying done by commercial copyshops.
So it is hardly as complicated to coordinate
copyright permissioning as Crews makes it
out to be. Nor do I see why he thinks libraries
can’t readily charge individual students for
their e-reserve services; after all, they charge
them for keeping books out too long, and
whatever mechanism is used for that function
could be used to charge e-reserve fees also,
if the university wants to treat them the same
way coursepack charges are handled.
Crews further argues that copyshops do not
have much incentive to apply fair use because
they can simply pass extra costs of getting
permissions along to publishers. But this
claim flies in the face of the evidence a group
of publishers uncovered when they joined in
bringing a series of suits against copyshops
that did not want to get permissions precisely
because they could be more competitive in
pricing with copyshops that did. Crews’ argument sounds logical enough, but he cites no
evidence to back it up.
Finally, I would contest Crews’ argument
in the second half of the Rebuttal Report that
fair use has almost nothing to do with the
threats to scholarly publishing today. Yes, he
rightly observes that library purchasing decisions, heavily pressured by rapidly rising costs
of STM journals (originally in print and then
later in electronic form) have severely affected
the market for books published by university
presses. And, yes, the “open access” movement has led to new ways of thinking about
the whole enterprise. But the reality is that
income from permissions is not negligible and
constitutes enough of the revenue stream for
university presses to keep them from having
to ask their parent universities for even higher
operating subsidies. Indeed, I believe that for
most presses that income is more than double
or triple what the income is for eBook sales so
far. There is no recognition in Crews’ reports
that universities that have presses show no
signs of increasing their subsidy support for
them, and that universities without presses
are not willing to pay anything to support
the entire system from which they benefit, as
was recommended way back in 1979 by the
National Enquiry into Scholarly Communicacontinued on page 59
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tion. GSU has, in fact, been a “free rider” on
this system for years, not even paying its fair
share of permission fees to support the system indirectly. It remains to be seen whether,
under the revised policy, these payments will
increase significantly, as they should.
My own personal view is that the idea
of “transformative use,” as deployed in the
Second (not the Ninth) Circuit, holds a lot
of promise for the way university presses
should regard fair use, both as users and as
publishers. Indeed, many of our presses are
now using fair use to defend such practices
as not seeking permission to use film stills in
scholarly books about that medium of culture,
which is a classic example of “transformative
use.” What we should continue to oppose,
as basically threatening our continued survival and as constituting a parasitical form of
publishing, is the mere duplication of copies
with no value added, which is what mostly
happens with coursepacks and e-reserves.
This is the difference between “creative” and
“duplicative” types of copying that Georgia
Harper emphasized in her blog. Congress,
unfortunately, opened the Pandora’s box when
it included a reference to “multiple copies” in
the language of Section 107, and we have been
suffering from this ever since. I have no less
an authority than Crews himself admitting,
in his Chicago book, that “despite its denials, Congress was unquestionably changing
the law” (p. 33). As Crews explains, “three
subtle, but important, changes in Section
107 emerged during congressional reviews
and hearings: fair use was expressly applied
to the reproduction of materials; it permitted
multiple copies for classroom use; and the
nonprofit character of a use became an explicit factor in the fair use equation” (p. 32).

In fact, the study of fair-use jurisprudence
that Congress asked the Copyright Office to
prepare leading up to the revision of the law
in 1976 revealed that no judge had ever ruled
that straightforward reproduction of a copyrighted work for its own sake was a fair use.
While “multiple copies” are now referenced
in Section 107 explicitly, we can reasonably
argue that this should be interpreted in a de
minimis sense because, as Judge Newman
famously said in the Texaco decision, whatever social utility this kind of copying may
have, it has nothing to do with what fair use
traditionally meant:
We would seriously question whether
the fair use analysis that has developed
with respect to works of authorship
alleged to use portions of copyrighted
material is precisely applicable to copies produced by mechanical means.
The traditional fair use analysis, now
codified in section 107, developed in
an effort to adjust the competing interests of the authors — the author of
the original copyrighted work and the
author of the secondary work that “copies” a portion of the original work in the
course of producing what is claimed to
be a new work. Mechanical “copying”
of an entire document, made readily
feasible by the advent of xerography…,
is obviously an activity entirely different from creating a work of authorship.
Whatever social utility copying of this
sort achieves, it is not concerned with
creative authorship.
It is anyone’s guess how the GSU case will
ultimately turn out, and it is not the purpose
of this article to make any predictions. Judge
Evans, presiding in this case, has shown
herself to be well-informed about copyright
and respectful of past opinions. She is no L.
Ray Patterson, who was actually the defense

attorney in one of the copyright cases she
handled in her district in which he was on the
losing side. And her interpretation of “transformative use” follows the functional test
developed by David Nimmer in the authoritative treatise Nimmer on Copyright rather than
the radically new type of functional analysis
propagated by the Ninth Circuit in various of
its rulings over the past several years. (For
more about these types of functional tests,
see my article “Is ‘Functional’ Use ‘Transformative’ and Hence ‘Fair’? in Against the
Grain, v.21#3, June 2009.) While I had earlier predicted that Judge Pierre Leval, who
is credited with greatly influencing judicial
thinking about “transformative use,” would
not find the Ninth Circuit’s decisions to be
consistent with his own concept, only to be
disabused by Leval himself when he gave the
Christopher Meyer Memorial Lecture titled
“Did Campbell Repair Fair Use?” at George
Washington University on June 2, 2009,
Leval in private correspondence subsequently
did affirm that he does not “read Perfect
10 as authorizing, or opening the door to,
free distribution of books to students on the
grounds that that is a transformative use, all
the more so when the books are themselves
of an educational nature. I rejected virtually
the same argument in the Texaco case, which
I had in the district court. I recall making the
observation that allowing Texaco free access
to the scientific publications of the plaintiffs
on the ground that Texaco was using them for
scientific purposes would be an appropriation
of the plaintiffs’ market.” So, whatever Judge
Evans may think about the Ninth Circuit
cases, we may hope that she, like Leval, will
still reject the kind of sweeping argument
about “transformative use” that Crews, following Band, puts forward to turn fair use
into a truly radical justification for merely
“duplicative” copying.

@Brunning: People & Technology
At the only Edge that Means Anything / How We Understand What We Do
by Dennis Brunning (E Humanities Development Librarian, Arizona State University) <dennis.brunning@gmail.com>
Google Zeitgeist 2009
If you haven’t, check out Google Zeitgeist. The algorithmic aladdins
in Mountain View have compiled local lists for the most popular searches
of select US cities and then ranked them based on how unique these
searches were for that city. A search is unique if it is “disproportionately
popular in a particular city compared to the rest of the country.”
Here are the ten most unique and popular searches in the
Chicago, Illinois area:
1. impact cps
6. metromix Chicago
2. cta bus tracker
7. Harold Washington college
3. second city cop
8. paws Chicago
4. rta trip planner
9. Chicago public library
5. Southdown star
10. uic.edu
The most popular “impact cps” is the grade tracking site for
Chicago Public Schools. There are two transportation system
Websites, a popular blog, a local online edition of the Sun-Times
newspaper, a local entertainment weekly newspaper, and a local
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no-kill animal shelter. Interestingly, four sites are higher education sites.
Repeated throughout the city by city accounts are education sites and
most impressively many library sites. Admittedly there are also many
jail sites which bear some kinship with public school grade tracking
sites (progress through a system!).
It’s difficult to say what the search scientists at Google make of these
popularities. It’s probably read as the dominance of the Internet by youth
(who else goes to school, gets in trouble, and take the bus...). More practically,
it illustrates how simple we understand search; and that search is local.
What we need to know, though, is what users search
when they arrive from Google to the sought after cyberplace. And this Google isn’t telling us. We assume this
is proprietary and the Zeitgeist here will remain secret
and protected. For librarians, however, it is edifying to
confirm our space is unique, popular, and local.
Your link: http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/press/
zeitgeist2009/cities.html
continued on page 60
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